The Svatantra Vijnaanavaada school is called so because it accepts that reality is pure consciousness (Vijnaanavaada) and wants to support it with independent (svatantra) reasoning. Modern scholars also refer to this school as the epistemo-logical school of Buddhism as its main concentration is on the twin subjects of the means of knowledge and the canons governing formal logic. Due to this, this school is also sometimes referred to as the Buddhist Nyaaya and as is natural, historically it engaged in sustained polemics against the Nyaaya school.

Buddhist logic is at once logic, epistemology and metaphysics combined. It is logic since it deals with syllogism (paraarthaanumaana), inference (svaarthaanumaana) and the import of words (apoha). It is epistemology since it undertakes a thorough investigation of sense perception (pratyaksham), the validity of knowledge (praamaanya) and the means of cognition (pramaana). It is also metaphysics since it discusses the real nature of sensation and thought and admits that Reality is supra-logical.

HISTORY AND LITERATURE

Vasubandhu's disciple Dignaaga (480 CE) is considered to be the founder of the Svatantra Vijnaanavaada school. According to Taranatha, Dignaaga was a Brahmin from Kanchipuram, in modern Tamil Nadu, who embraced the Middle Way and enjoyed the nickname of "bull in debate" since was quite skilled in debating. Pramaana Samuccayam is the magnum opus of Dignaaga, where he undertakes to complete the logical teachings of his master Vaasubandhu. But the text is lost to us in its original Sanskrit. Alambanapariksha, Alambanaparikshavritti and Nyaayamukha are other works attributed to Dignaaga.

Dharmakirti, a Brahmin from Andhra who is renowned for his penetrating intellect and biting sarcasm, was the able follower of Dignaaga who fully elaborated the school's doctrines in his Pramaana Vaartikam. Pramaanavinischaya (of which the famous Nyaayabindhu is an abstract), Hetubindhu and Vaadanyaaya are other works attributed to Dharmakirti.

Santarakshita and Kamalashila, the last great Buddhist teachers of India and the cultural conquerors of Tibet, whom we've already referred to in the section on the Maadhyamika school, were also exponents of the Svatantra Vijnaanavaada.

Svatantra Vijnaanavaada represents the last significant development of Buddhist philosophy in India and as with other schools its exponents too have left behind an enormously rich philosophical literature.

FUNDAMENTAL POSITION

There's nothing permanent in empirical experience. If one is to be faithful to logic then it follows that you cannot assert the existence of a thing which you cannot prove. Though Consciousness is the truth, still its permanence is not common experience - so even vijnana is only momentary. This distinction between momentary consciousness with eternal consciousness marks the fundamental distinction in metaphysics between the Svatantra Vijnaanavaadins and the original Vijnaanavaadins. The Svatantra Vijnaanavaadins revive the doctrine of momentariness and fuse it with Vijnaanavaada - in this enterprise they move away from the purely epistemological approach of the Maadhyamikas and the psychological approach of the original Vijnaanavaadins and sculpt an unique ontology based on Sautraantika conception of momentariness. (It is our opinion that the the clamor in Indian philosophical circles for a clear ontological position of the Buddhists and the perceived affinity between the eternal Vijnaaptimaatrataa and the transcendental Atman doctrine of the Vedaantins, might have caused the Svatantra Vijnaanavaadins to strike out in this new direction).

CAUSALITY AND MOMENTARINESS

It is not logical to assert that a permanent thing produces effects. If it were so then having the efficient cause present, it should produce all the effects simultaneously - which is not the way of the world where effects are produced successively. If it is said that a permanent entity produces successive effects in association with successive accessories, then the question arises whether the accessories work by producing a particular modification in the permanent cause or whether they work independently. In case of the former, what's the relation between the permanent entity and the modification - identity or difference? If it is identity then it is the modification which is the cause and not the permanent entity. If the modification is different from the permanent cause, then how is the relation between them established? The accessories cannot work independently either as a permanent cause cannot tolerate the independent functioning of the accessories. Plus the nature of the relation between the entity and the accessories is difficult to establish. It cannot be identity or productivity as the accessories are different from the cause. It cannot be inherence either as the role is only of assistance. If the nature of the permanent cause with the accessories is the same as without them, then either the accessories are also permanent and should give rise to simultaneous creation or they are useless!

Likewise causality is not real production but only functional interdependence. The cause doesn't produce the effect as it doesn't have time to do so. The cause merely precedes the effect and the effect merely follows the cause. Things arise neither out of themselves, nor out of non-self, nor both, nor neither. Effects are merely functionally dependent upon their causes. All dharmas therefore are inactive and forceless. There's no contradiction as there's no efficiency apart from existence and existence itself is causal efficiency.

MOMENTARINESS

Change exists by itself and always. Reality is momentariness. Things appear and disappear. But disappearance doesn't mean the annihilation of a positive entity - it only means that it is momentary. Momentariness implies production as well as destruction. Destruction doesn't depend on any cause and all the so called factors of destruction are in reality inefficacious and forceless. Destruction in one way means the momentary character of a thing (kshana sthithi dharma rupa vinaasha) and in another way means disruption (dhvamsa rupa naasha). Production and destruction are not anything apart from the entity. There's transcendental impermanence and being momentary, production and destruction are part and parcel of the momentary entity itself. Destruction is born along with the production of the momentary thing itself.

Momentariness implies becoming. A thing is momentary since it appears, exists and perishes. So the real and the existent is the causally efficient. The unreal is the inefficient and we are not concerned about its existence or non-existence. A real fire is that which burns, cooks and sheds light. A fire which neither burns nor cooks is unreal. The ultimate existent is the momentary particular "thing in itself". It is the "this", the "here", the "now", the "present moment of efficiency". Shorn of all objectivized images it is beyond expression.

Reality is change and change is ceaseless. Motion is the moving thing itself and efficiency is the efficient thing itself. Motion, change, efficiency, existence are all only names for the momentary thing-in-itself.

But again motion itself is an illusion, as things in reality being momentary do not have any time to move. Motion is actually a series of immobilities. Like a lamp where a series of different flames produce an illusion of a single flame, so do flashes of energies which follow one another give rise to an illusion of motion.

Kshana is the nature of a thing to disappear after existing for one moment. The thing which possesses this nature is called Kshanika. But in reality there's no difference between momentary character and the thing that possesses the momentary character. The momentary character itself is the momentary thing. The distinction is a product of the intellect and the creation of language and is useful for empirical purposes only.

But doesn't momentariness militate against the doctrine of karma? How could the faculty of recognition work? How could bondage and liberation belong to a momentary entity?

Just as in a flame where the flame of the current moment is not the flame of the past moment, but still we refer to it as one, so does memory work. When we recognize a thing of the present as the thing of the past, it is only a case of similarity and not identity. A thing exists for a moment and then a new thing appears. The identification between the two is the work of the intellect, which is not ultimately real. Its use is conventional only.

The cause produces the effect and then ceases to exist. The cause comes into existence in the first moment, produces the effect in the second moment and ceases to exist in the third moment. The causal efficiency ceases immediately after the production of the effect. Cause and effect are not simultaneous as the cause exists in the moment prior to the production of the effect. But there's no causality apart from the cause. The mere existence of the cause itself is the efficient causal operation. Existence itself is efficiency. It is invariable antecedence - cause being present, the effect necessarily follows.

So there's neither a doer nor an enjoyer, none who recognizes or remembers. There's only a series of changing mental states and the unity between them is an illusion. But the future is dependent upon the present. So the effect is dependent on the cause and the next mental state is dependent on the present mental state. To do good deeds is therefore necessary for good karma. Bondage is a series of painful mental states due to ignorance and liberation is the purification of these mental states by right knowledge.

PRAMAANAS

Perception (pratyaksha) and inference (anumaana) are the only two valid sources of knowledge.

Sensation and thought are different sources of knowledge. Sensation reflects the unique, momentary, existent, ultimate reality (svalakshana). Thought links up this chain of moments by constructing images and relations. Likewise there's a difference between perception and inference. We perceive a thing and then thought kicks in working out the images and relations. Perception gives us direct, vivid and concrete reflection of the object. Inference gives us only indirect, vague and abstract thought constructions. The realm of perception is only that which is grasped by the senses where only the sensible properties of the objects are perceived - like color or sound. It is inferential reasoning where the identity of the object perceived is formed - the universal.

Right knowledge is successful or efficacious knowledge. According to the Naiyaayikas perception is produced when the senses come into contact with external objects. Since for the Svatantra Vijnaanavaadin external objects have no existence outside of thought, Dignaaga defines perception as devoid of all conceptual activity - names, particulars, universals etc. The Svatantra Vijnaanavaadins dispute the view of the Vaisheshikas for whom perception occurs in two moments - first as pure sensation and then as thought determination where the five predicables of the object - generality, particularity, relation, quality and action - are grasped. Dignaaga condemns the Naiyaayikas classification of perception as indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and determinate (savikalpa) as fictions of the intellect. The object of perception is the momentary, unique, thing in itself, shorn of all relations. Perception is non-illusive cognition devoid of all determinations and illusions of thought.

For Dignaaga, the example with inseparable connection (like smoke to fire) and its application (when we see smoke we infer that there's a fire), is enough to establish inference. Though inference is the work of the intellect and its validity doesn't reach up to the level of the ultimate truth, still its authority in the phenomenal plane is unquestionable. A true inference can never be invalidated and fire shall always be inferred from smoke. Shaantarakshita remarks that those who dispute the validity of inference contradict themselves, as even in their denial, they desire that their intention to deny validity to inference should be inferred from their words!

All other pramaanas can be reduced to either perception or inference, or they're not valid means of knowledge at all. Analogy (upamana) is a combination of perception and memory. Implication (arthaapatti) can be easily reduced to inference. Negation (abhaava) is either a non-entity or can be included under perception.

The Svatantra Vijnaanavaadins bitterly criticize the shabda pramaana (the Veda) of the Mimaamsakas. According to the Mimaamsakas the Vedas are eternal. The words, meanings and the relation between them are all eternal. The Vedas have neither a before nor an after and therefore it is authorless and eternal. The injunctions and prohibitions in the Vedas are all we need. Since ignorance, hatred and jealousy are found in persons, words of persons are therefore unreliable.

The Buddists retort that since knowledge, non-jealousy and non-hatred which are the causes of the reliability of words are found in persons, therefore words of persons are reliable. The Veda itself cannot reveal its meaning and only persons are capable of writing or expressing words. It is indeed a wonder that there are people who can uphold a clearly absurd view that because we cannot remember its authors, the Veda is not the creation of persons! By this logic all other works for which authors are not known have to be considered as authorless and eternal! We shall also have to attach absolute reliability to the words of the heterodox outsiders the origin of which cannot be traced and to those despicable practices of the mlechchhas (like marrying ones own mother or daughter!), the origin of which is not known.

Also if the Mimaamsaka has the right to give particular meanings to ordinary words like 'svarga' or 'Urvashi', then who can question us if we say that the Veda instructs people to eat the flesh of a dog or that it teaches that the Buddha is omniscient? Just because there's some truth in the Veda, it doesn't mean that it is wholly true. Only the true words of trustworthy persons which do not contradict our experience that should be recognized as the Agama. If the Mimaamsaka is really eager to establish the authority of the Veda then he should try to prove that the Vedas are the word of a realized being who has risen above all ignorance. And indeed, right words embodying truth and goodness and emanating from persons highly intelligent and merciful, do claim validity.

It is foolish to fall back on the shastra for everything. In respect to those things the truth of which can be proved by perception or inference, the shastra can be ignored. A husband with his own eyes saw his wife in a compromising position with another man. When he rebuked her, she cried to her friends : "see the utter folly of my husband who relies on his bubble-like eyes and refuses to believe the words of his faithful wife!". To have blind faith in every word of the shastra is like believing a corrupt woman at the cost of one's own eyes!

APOHA

All words, names and concepts are only relative and hence unreal. A word has no meaning in itself and can express its meaning only by rejecting its opposite meaning - like "cow" means "not non-cow". Names gives us universals which are at best only conceptions of the intellect and hence are without any real basis - they are illusory and negative. They cannot access reality - the thing in itself - which is real and affirmative though ultimately transcends all the categories of the intellect. The thing in itself is beyond language and intellect. Neither the universal, nor the relation between the object and the universal, nor that which possesses the universal, nor the form of cognition of the object can really be called the import of words - they are only a figment of the imagination.

But doesn't even saying "the word cow denotes the universal negation of the non-cow" implicitly accept the reality of the universal cow? Doesn't negation necessarily presuppose affirmation?

The Svatantra Vijnaanavaadins explain their stand thus : Negation is of two kinds - 1. relative negation or exclusion and 2. absolute negation or denial. Relative negation itself can be distinguished into two as that due to the difference of idea and that due to the difference of object. Infact no thing is the same, but still due to certain well defined potencies some of them are identified as similar. On account of this conception of similarity there arises a reflection in cognition which is wrongly grasped as an object i.e, universal. The denotative function of the world consists only in the production of this reflection. When this reflection is cognized the exclusion of other objects follows by implication. But the notion of other object is not part of the reflection. Thus while relative negation is directly cognized, absolute negation is indirectly cognized by implication. Thus there's no affirmation without negation.

Exclusions are a product of the intellect and do not apply to things. Things in themselves are neither unified nor diversified and it is only the conceptual content that appears as diverse. The object "cow" and the object "non-cow" are separate well established realities and words do not touch them. But due to the force of ignorance, words mistake their own internal reflections to be external objects. And words can reflect individuals only and not universals. So universals can neither be denoted nor excluded by words. Even if they're excluded they do not become real. When a thing excludes another it is called its Apoha. But by this, neither the thing becomes negative nor does the apoha really become positive. Thus a cow which is the negation of the non-cow is a positive entity and is different from the non-cow. In the phenomenal sense apohas are considered to be positive and cannot be taken as non-entities. But in the ultimate sense, since there's neither that which denotes nor that which is denoted, there's no object which can be denoted by Apoha.

VIJNAANAVAADA

Consciousness is the only reality and the so called external objects do not exist independent and outside of consciousness. It is consciousness which manifests itself as the subject and object. Consciousness being what it is - that its basic condition is that it should be conscious of something - so this object condition or knowable aspect of consciousness is the cause of the so called external objects. The so called external objects only appears so for the knowing subject - but in the ultimate sense both the subject and object are unreal.

But if the object is a part of consciousness and appears simultaneously with it, then how can it be a condition to consciousness itself?

Dignaaga replies that the object whose essence is consciousness and which is only the knowable aspect of consciousness appears as if it is something external and also serves as a condition to consciousness because of its invariable association with consciousness and also because of its transmitting the force in succession. The organs of sense is only the force of consciousness which acts as an auxiliary cause to enable consciousness to manifest itself. This force is something internal to consciousness. Thus the object which is the knowable act of consciousness and the sense organs which are only the force of consciousness go on determining each other from beginning less time.

The object is nothing but relative existence which is dependent on causes and conditions. The external object is the form in which consciousness manifests itself under causes and conditions. The diversity in phenomenal experience among people is due to the different mental dispositions and forces and not due to the so called plurality of external objects. Consciousness is the unity which manifests itself internally as the subject and externally as the object. And even this distinction between internal and external is made only within the field of consciousness itself. Both the subject and object are mutually relative - the existence of one depends on the other. The non-dual pure consciousness ultimately transcends this subject-object duality. All the categories of the intellect are appearances which are sunk in duality - these appearances are unreal because they are indefinable. The manifestation of consciousness as subject and object is only appearance and reality is pure consciousness. It is only due to ignorance that the non-dual pure consciousness appears as the duality of the subject and object. But both the subject and object are ultimately unreal - the subject which is the Ego is the root cause of all suffering.

Consciousness is formless (niraakaara). But regardless of whether consciousness arises with or without form, the fact is that it can never cognize any object for the simple reason that such an object doesn't exist. Consciousness needs nothing else for apprehension. Consciousness is self-luminous and self consciousness mean the unconsciousness nature of consciousness - consciousness abiding in itself and being the thing in itself.

But even if consciousness is self-luminous doesn't it still need an external object for its function of apprehension?

Since we cannot distinguish between cognition and its function, cognition itself means the apprehension of an external object and there it needs neither any other function nor an external object.

Consciousness is 'without a second' (advaya). It is essentially self-luminous and by its very nature is the essence of true knowledge.

THE BUDDHA

Dharmakirti with all religious fervour salutes the Buddha whom he declares to be pure consciousness transcending all categories of the intellect (vidhutakalpanaajaala); from whom rays of consciousness burst forth in every direction (samantasphuranatvit); who is pure existence (dharmakaya); who is deep and pure bliss (gambhirodaraa-murti) and who is full of compassion on all sides (samantabhadra).

But Dharmakirti denies omniscience to the Buddha whom he says is absolutely reliable only because he possesses true knowledge and since he knows and prescribes the means to achieve true knowledge and to realize that which is good and that which is bad. Neither omniscience nor far-sightedness need be the virtues of reliable persons - for omniscience is impossible in this world and if far-sightedness is the criterion of truth, the we should adore the Vultures!

Shaantarakshita however differs from Dharmakirti and declares the Buddha to be omniscient. Refuting the arguments of the Mimaamsakas against omniscience, Shaantarakshita and Kamalashila say : Just because we cannot perceive something doesn't mean it doesn't exist. Mere non-apprehension doesn't prove the non-existence of a thing. At best there can only be doubt, but not certainty. An omniscient being cannot be perceived by ordinary people - one needs to be omniscient to know the omniscient.

Through yogic practices and understanding the true meaning of nairatmaya all coverings of ignorance are removed and omniscience is realized and oneness with the Buddha attained. When the unreality of the object (dharma nairaatmaya) and the unreality of the subject (pudgala nairatmaya) is realized and the truth of consciousness as the only reality is known, the cycle of birth and death ceases. This state is called Apavarga.